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The presidents of Kosovo and Serbia, Hashim Thaçi and Aleksandar Vu#i#, have
recently considered an exchange of territories (“land swap”) between their two
countries which would lead to Serbia’s formal recognition of the independence
of Kosovo (which unilaterally seceded from Serbia first in 1990 and then again in
2008). Both countries aspire EU membership but neither is likely to accede unless
Serbia recognizes Kosovo. The EU could only admit a state which is recognized by
all of its Member States; and Kosovo is not recognized by five EU Member States,
primarily because Serbia, its former host state, does not recognize it. If Serbia were
to recognize Kosovo, these five states are most likely to follow suit.
Of course, international and municipal law do not envisage “land swaps”; these are
usually categorized as border changes or “corrections”. In the case of Kosovo and
Serbia, the envisaged borders changes are twofold: first, the border of Serbia would
move southwards into northern Kosovo, to cover the areas mainly inhabited by
Serbs and, second, (at the same time) the border of Kosovo would move eastward,
from the bottom southeast corner of Kosovo, into the Preševo Valley, to cover
the areas which are predominantly inhabited by Albanians. Currently, there is no
specific indication which areas would be covered by the border changes and which
demarcation lines the new borders would follow. In any case, there are no ‘natural’
geographic or demographic lines which could be used in the demarcation process.
How the borders will be demarcated, who will decide on the demarcation, and
whether any international bodies or experts would be called to participate in this
demarcation project is still unclear.
At the present stage, this vagueness is understandable: the idea of a “land swap”
is currently only “testing the waters” – gauging international responses to such an
idea. And, as expected, the initial responses were varied: from outright rejection
to a cautious welcome or, even positive excitement (“a very historic moment”). In
the process of “testing the waters”, no one – least of all the presidents of Kosovo
and of Serbia, who had been advocating the “swap” – are considering the legal and
constitutional procedures needed to effect such a change.
Legal/Constitutional Hurdles
Article 8 of Serbia’s Constitution stipulates that the state borders are inviolate and
may only be altered through the procedure appropriate for the amendment of the
- 1 -
Constitution. According to article 203, this requires a two-thirds majority of the total
number of deputies of the National Assembly. At the same time, article 18 (1) of
the Constitution of Kosovo also demands for a two-thirds majority of all deputies
of the Kosovo assembly for the ratification of any international agreement dealing
with territory. Hence, the ratification of any bilateral treaty regarding the change of
borders would face the same hurdle in both states: the requirement of a two-third
majority of all deputies in both parliaments.
At the moment, this requirement cannot be met: the prime minister of Kosovo,
Ramush Hardinaj, vehemently opposes any such change, at least as long as he
merely holds a precarious majority in Kosovo’s assembly. The Serbian government
is facing a highly fractured opposition which has not yet rejected the “land swap” but
the government does not currently hold a two-thirds majority to pass any such treaty
either.
There are further legal obstacles in both Constitutions facing the ratification a treaty
of this kind. Article 1 (3) of the Constitution of Kosovo states that Kosovo shall “seek
no union with any State or a part of any State”. The envisaged change of borders
appears to place Kosovo in union with a part of Serbia. Article 203 of Serbia’s
constitution requires that any changes of the preamble of the Constitution have to
be put to a referendum of all citizens. Furthermore, the preamble states that the
Province of Kosovo and Metohija are “an integral part of the territory of Serbia”. Any
decision to remove this reference would require a majority in the referendum; without
a referendum, any decision recognizing that Kosovo is no longer an integral part of
Serbia would be subject to a constitutional challenge.
In view of these hurdles, one can envisage at least three distinct scenarios of
international response to a bilateral treaty between Serbia and Kosovo, concerning
specific synchronized border changes.
Three Scenarios
First scenario
The treaty is signed but fails to be ratified in one or both parliaments. In
consequence, the treaty remains unimplemented: no border changes take place.
In this scenario, the president and the government of Kosovo could claim that
by signing the treaty, Serbia automatically recognized Kosovo’s independence.
The Serbian president could then neither confirm nor deny such a claim by the
government of Kosovo. If Serbia did not reject the recognition of Kosovo anymore,
it would open up a way for all EU countries to recognize Kosovo’s independence
as well. That means, as a result, the five EU Member Sstates which currently do
not recognize Kosovo could be convinced to do so and the EU Commission would
most certainly consider the matter of Kosovo’s international recognition closed. The
non-recognition of Kosovo would then no longer be an obstacle to the accession
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of either Kosovo (now recognized by all EU Member States) or Serbia which would
then satisfy one condition for its accession.
In this scenario, the bilateral treaty was primarily a ploy that both signatories
intentionally used to remove the obstacle of Kosovo’s non-recognition for the
accession process. For this scenario to succeed, both signatories needed to
cooperate; in particular, Serbia’s president and his government needed at least
to refrain from opposing the claim that the signing of the treaty amounts to the
recognition of Kosovo’s independence.
Second scenario
In this scenario, the bilateral treaty is signed and ratified (in some way) but contains
a clause specifying that Serbia’s signature of the treaty does not imply its recognition
of Kosovo; Serbia’s recognition would follow once the treaty is implemented.
It is noteworthy that some EU Member States reject any “land swap” treaty and
threaten to block any future accession of either state to the EU if the treaty is
implemented. For example, the German government stated that it is against any
changes of borders in the Balkans. In contrast to the German government, the US
administration currently appears to be ready to recognize the change of borders).
In this scenario, in order to remove the threat of the blocked accession to the
EU, either party can abandon the treaty and the corresponding land swap. This,
however, would not remove the initial obstacle of non-recognition of Kosovo to their
accession to the EU.
One possible outcome of this scenario is that one or both states decide that the
conditions for accession to the EU are too onerous and the eventual accession is
too uncertain. In consequence, they can also abandon plans for accession to the
EU and seek economic and strategic partners elsewhere – in the USA, Russia and
China. This would reduce the EU’s capacity to influence policies and politicians in
the region and thus to influence Serbia’s government to recognize the independence
of Kosovo.
Third scenario
No EU Member State opposes the border changes and threatens to block
accession. Therefore, the two countries sign and implement the treaty on border
changes. Serbia and all the EU Member States recognize Kosovo. A happy end or a
dangerous scenario?
A dangerous Scenario?
The argument against this last scenario, repeated by some diplomats and
statesmen, who were involved in the Balkan peace management in the past, is that a
successful “land swap” will encourage other states in the region to “change” borders
in a similar way leading to a repetition of the violent conflict in the region. However,
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no evidence is presented which would indicate that successful implementation of
a consensual bilateral Kosovo/Serbia border change would lead to or encourage
attempts at unilateral territorial change by armed force in any other part of the
Balkans.
There is some evidence unrelated to the current discussion of a possible land
swap that the government and the population of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and
Herzegovina would have preferred to secede from the present host state. At the
same time, the Albanian population and their political leaders in Macedonia would
prefer to transfer the territories on which they live to Albanian-majority countries,
Albania or Kosovo. But there is no evidence that these groups possess an armed
force with which these changes could be carried out and that they would receive,
from Serbia or from Albania/Kosovo, any military or other support for that purpose.
Apart from the fact that, if ratified, such an agreement would be perfectly legal, it
remains questionable how a consensual and non-violent territorial change agreed
between two sovereign states in the region could lead to or encourage violent
conflict elsewhere in the region. If this consensual territorial change was carried out
against the wishes of powerful EU Member States such as Germany, this would
rather indicate that the EU and its Member States do not have the political power to
stop territorial change of which it does not approve.
Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, the EU and the US acting together
have been able to prevent any border changes in the Balkans they considered
unacceptable. The third scenario would show that the EU or its Member States,
without US support, are no longer able to do so. There are of course two options
here: either the EU Member States can prevent this “swap” by threatening to block
accession of the two parties (as envisaged in the second scenario) or they can
appropriate this territorial border change as an EU project which can be carried out
only with the approval and participation of the EU.
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